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Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been proven the-
oretically secure at the protocol level. However, the
security may be compromised through deviation from
theoretical models in device implementation or opera-
tion. For each deviation, thorough understanding must
be achieved in order for subsequent construction of ro-
bust countermeasures.
In Ref. 1, we have studied the effectiveness of bright il-
lumination attacks, a group of attacks targeting gated In-
GaAs avalanche photodiodes (APDs).2,3 We found that
gated APDs are naturally resilient against continuous-
wave (CW) attacks through the gain modulation effect.4
The finding is contrary to the claim by Lydersen et al.2
that “the loophole is likely to be present in most QKD
systems using APDs to detect single photons”. The
detector loophole reported by Lydersen et al.2 was in
fact due to inappropriate settings in the discrimination
level of single photon APDs. Furthermore, we discussed
the respective effectiveness for temporally-tailored bright
illumination3 and after-gate attacks,5 as summarized in
Table I. Against bright illumination attacks, “monitoring
the photocurrent” was proposed as a counter-measure,
which was based on the measured difference in the APD
currents as compared with normal operation, see Fig. 1.
In the preceding comment,6 we note that Lydersen et
al. do not dispute that bright light attacks are ineffec-
tive if the detector parameters are set correctly, which
was our main finding. Instead, they challenge the ro-
bustness of the counter-measure we proposed. To serve
this challenge, they have designed a new attack7 that uses
faint optical pulses (≤120 photons/pulse) only. The at-
tack exploits the super-linear count dependence achieved
by restricting the avalanche duration.8,9 In the absence
of bright illumination, Lydersen et al. claim, unfortu-
nately without experimental elaboration, that the attack
“would not be detectable”6 by monitoring the current
and “the afterpulsing is negligible”.7 It should be pointed
out that Lydersen et al. reported a high quantum bit
error ratio (QBER) of >12% during the attack, which
would be easily detected by the legitimate users of the
system, even for a 100 kHz clock rate which significantly
favours the attacker.
Although the illumination during the attack is weak,
Lydersen et al. have overlooked the fact that the APD
gain is still large, and thus the attack generates a sizable
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photocurrent that can easily be detected by the users.
We prove this with a simple experiment. A gated InGaAs
APD is subjected to faint illumination by a 50 ps pulsed
laser. The APD is gated with 2 MHz pulses of 4 V am-
plitude and 3.5 ns duration, a gating condition identical
to previously used in an actual QKD system.10 Its single
photon detection efficiency is measured to be 15% with
a dark count probability of 3.5 × 10−5 per gate. In the
attack, the pulse delay is optimized to have a minimum
QBER that the attack would have caused with a flux of
120 photons. Under this optimized delay, the count prob-
ability and photocurrent are measured as a function of
attacking flux, as shown in Fig. 1. Super-linearity regime
used in the faint after-gate attack is identified as occur-
ring at fluxes between 70-300 photons/pulse. Within this
flux range, the APD current is macroscopic, and actually
easily detectable. At around 9 µA, this current is more
than 40 times stronger than would be under normal QKD
operation for this APD,11 see Fig. 1.
Macroscopic current causes afterpulsing.12 In Fig. 1,
for an attacking flux less than 60 photons/pulse, the
count probability shows a slightly sub-linear dependence,
closely resembling that of the photocurrent. This sub-
linear behavior can be explained only by the dominance
of afterpulsing, and this assignment has been verified
by the gated afterpulse measurement technique.13–15 As
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FIG. 1. Count probability and photocurrent when under the
faint after-gate attack as a function of photon flux. Arrows
in the right axis label respective currents measured for nor-
mal operation, faint after-gate attack and bright illumination
attacks.
2can be extrapolated from the linear dependence, the af-
terpulsing is not negligible in the super-linear regime.
Therefore, contrary to the intuitive claims by Lydersen et
al., the faint after-gate attack not only causes significant
current but also produces non-negligible afterpulses. In
addition to the resultant QBER,7 monitoring the APD
current is an effective counter-measure against this at-
tack, although it was initially proposed for bright illumi-
nation attacks.1
The experiment shown in Fig. 1 illustrates again the
importance of careful analysis of any proposed attack.
Careful analysis is the very foundation, upon which a
robust, effective counter-measure can be constructed.
Against an attack, two strategies are usually adopted:
(i) bounding the information leakage, followed by pri-
vacy amplification; and (ii) deterministic detection or ex-
clusion. Only attacks that are not easily detected on a
properly implemented system need to be accounted for in
the privacy amplification analysis, e.g., the photon num-
ber splitting attack.16,17 This is certainly not the case
for the various detector blinding attacks which rely upon
a poor design of the APD circuit and which generate a
large, easily-detectable photocurrent in the device.
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3TABLE I. Summary of attacks targeting the photocurrent mode of gated InGaAs APDs.
Attack Effectiveness (without counter-
measure)
Fingerprint Counter-measure
CW blinding2 Ineffective to correctly operated
devices
High photocurrent Monitor the current
CW thermal
blinding3
Ineffective to correctly operated
devices
High photocurrent Monitor the current
Thermal blinding of
frames3
Limited effectiveness to burst-
mode systems
High photocurrent; Giveaway
photon clicks
Monitor the current
sinkhole blinding3 Limited effectiveness to APDs
with an AC-coupled output; In-
effective to DC-coupled APDs
High photocurrent; Giveaway
photon clicks
Monitor the current
After-gate5 Limited effectiveness to burst-
mode systems
Photon arrival timing; High
QBER due to afterpulses
Use of narrow modulation and/or
detection acceptance window
Faint after-gate7 Ineffective due to high QBER High photocurrent; High QBER
due to finite count super-linearity
and afterpulses
Monitor the current
